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Abstract 
Over the last twenty years, the extent of defined benefit provision has declined substantially in the 
United Kingdom.  Whilst most of the focus has been on deficits relating to past benefit accrual, a 
more important consideration is the increasing cost of future benefit accrual.  In particular, I look at 
how the cost of pensions has changed relative to the cost of non-pensions earnings.  I also look at 
the main components of the change in pensions cost – those relating to benefits payable, discount 
rates and longevity – to analyse their relative importance.  I find that the cost of employing a 
member of defined benefit pension scheme has outpaced the cost of employing someone in a 
defined contribution arrangement by 1.1% of earnings per annum from 1995 to 2015.  As at March 
2015, the total cost of accrual was 25.4% of earnings. 
The average impact of interest rate changes on the change in the cost of accrual is 0.9% per annum.  
This is significantly more than the average impact of longevity improvements, which is 0.2% per 
annum.  Both of these have added to the total cost.  However, benefit changes marginally offset 
these increases, by around 0.05% per annum on average. 
Looking only at changes in interest rates, the estimated cost of accrual has risen to 36.7% of earnings 
as at September 2016.  If the current 2.5% LPI increases to pensions in payment were removed and 
replaced with conditional indexation, the cost of accrual for the employer would fall back to 27.0%.  
However, this is still more than three times the maximum level of auto-enrolment contributions that 
will be required – these peak at 8% of earnings in 2019.  It is also nearly seven times the current 
average level of contributions, which in 2015 stood at 4.0% of earnings.  If contribution rates to 
defined contribution arrangements do not rise, a large proportion of the population will reach 
retirement with inadequate retirement savings. 
This paper revisits and extends analysis I first published in 2008, which looked at the change in the 
cost and value of defined benefit pensions from 1995 to 2005 (Sweeting, 2008). 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Pension deficits 
Pension scheme deficits continue to be a cause of concern in the United Kingdom.  There are a 
number of different ways of measuring the shortfall of assets relative to liabilities, but the Pension 
Protection fund estimated that in 2015 there were sufficient assets to cover only 62% of buyout 
liabilities, and that in the previous ten years this figure has never risen above 68% (Pension 
2 
 
Protection Fund, 2015).  In terms of accounting deficits, actuaries Lane, Clark and Peacock estimate 
that as at 31 July 2016, liabilities exceeded assets by some £46 billion (Lane, Clark and Peacock, 
2016).  The negative impact of pension scheme deficits is a regular topic for the financial pages.  
However, deficits are largely a historical issue – in other words, they relate to liabilities that have 
already been accrued. 
1.2. The cost of pension accrual to employers 
At least as important are the costs for an employer that ongoing pension accrual continues to 
generate – and how that cost has changed over time.  This is a key theme of this paper.  In addition, 
it is important to recognise not only how much these costs have risen, but also what has driven 
these costs.  I therefore analyse the change in pension costs to identify the extent to which key 
drivers – discount rates, longevity, and the benefits payable – have affected the change in cost.  I 
also show the change in these costs in the context of other employment-related expenses, 
particularly National Insurance Contributions (NICs). 
1.3. The value of pension accrual to employees 
It is also important to recognise the relevance of defined benefit pension funding from another 
perspective – that is, how it has affected the value of earnings that individuals receive.  In other 
words, it is important to recognise how much the earnings of individuals have changed once the 
value of pension accrual is taken into account.  Danzer and Dolton (2012) reflect this when they 
propose a measure of total reward which includes not just pay, but pensions and other benefits in 
kind.  They go on to evaluate it as the present value of the sum of all these payments over an 
individual’s lifetime. 
This issue of pension accrual in this context is addressed in Sweeting (2008), which looks at the 
change in the cost and value of accrual from 1995 to 2005.  This paper extends that work to 2015 
and beyond, as well as improving the methodology. 
Other authors have looked at this issue in the context of public and private sector pensions.  All 
public sector schemes are defined benefit1, whilst private sector defined benefit provision is 
continuing to decline in importance.  Indeed, from 2004 to 2015, the number of active members of 
private sector defined benefit schemes fell from 3.6 million to 1.6 million.  Furthermore, of the 1.6 
million active members in private sector defined benefit schemes, only 0.6 million were in schemes 
or sections of schemes that were open to new members.  However, for public sector defined benefit 
schemes, the number of active members rose from 5.0 million to 5.6 million over the same period 
(Office for National Statistics 2015, 2016). 
A common approach in this type of analysis is to look at the average level of pension provision in the 
public and private sector.  Using this approach, Disney et al (2009) find that the impact of defined 
benefit pensions for public sector employees is to make employment more valuable than for private 
sector employees even if the latter are members of defined benefit pension plans.  This analysis 
controls for age, sex and education.  The clear limitation of this analysis is that not all private sector 
workers are accruing defined benefit pensions. 
Cribb and Emmerson (2016) go further than Disney et al (2009), controlling not just for age, sex, and 
education, but also for experience and region.  They carry out an examination of the impact of 
pensions on the pay of public and private sector workers, allowing for type of pension provision for 
                                                             
1 A partial exception is the Universities Superannuation Scheme, which has introduced a defined contribution 
section in addition to the main defined benefit scheme, whose benefits are now capped. 
3 
 
those in the private sector, thus overcoming the main limitation in the work of Disney et al.  Cribb 
and Emmerson value defined benefit pension accrual using the current unit method, which gives the 
change in discounted present value of the pension income from one year to the next, net of 
employee contributions.  For defined contribution pensions, Cribb and Emmerson look not only at 
the level of contributions, but also at the returns received.  This is used to give a view of the value of 
pension accrual in 2012 under a range of different scenarios.  They then go on to look at the average 
pay differential between public and private sector workers over time, allowing for the average level 
and type of pension provision in each group.  This analysis shows that public sector pay is 
significantly higher than private sector pay, even before allowing for pensions – and that pensions 
only increases this differential. 
Whilst this analysis is useful from an aggregate standpoint, it does not explicitly address the question 
of the impact over time on an individual who is a member of a defined benefit rather than a defined 
contribution scheme.  This is important because the decline in private sector defined benefit 
provision has been matched by the growth in private sector defined contribution provision.  The 
Office for National Statistics (2015, 2016) reports that over the period 2004 to 2015, active 
membership of occupational defined contribution schemes – that is, those defined contribution 
schemes set up by an employer under trust law – rose from 1.0 million to 3.9 million, although the 
bulk of this rise came as a result of the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST), which received a 
large number of members following the introduction of auto-enrolment2.  This is emphasised by the 
fact that active membership of defined contribution schemes grew from 1.2 million to 3.2 million 
between 2013 and 2014, the period during which auto-enrolment came into effect. 
The process of auto-enrolment is being rolled out until February 20183, so the growth of active 
membership in defined contribution plans can be expected to continue.  However, it is important to 
note that the level of contributions allowed for by auto-enrolment is not large.  Until April 2018, the 
minimum contribution is 2% of salary, of which the employer must pay at least 1% of salary; the 
total contribution is expected to rise to 5%, with a minimum employer contribution of 2%, in April 
2018; and from April 2019, it is proposed that the minimum will rise again to 8% of salaries and an 
employer minimum of 3% of salaries4.  Even the 2018 levels exceed current levels of contribution to 
defined contribution schemes: the Office for National Statistics (2016) estimates that in 2015, 
members of open defined contribution schemes contributed 1.5% of salaries, with employers 
contributing 2.5% of salaries.  These figures are lower even than in 2014, where employees 
contributed 1.7% of salaries and employers contributed 2.9% of salaries (Office for National 
Statistics, 2015).  These low rates are coincident with the introduction of auto-enrolment – in 2013, 
employees contributed 2.5% of salaries, with employers paying 6.0%.  This suggests that 
contribution rates for the newly auto-enrolled are at or close to legal minima. 
This suggests that auto-enrolment – particularly when higher contribution rates arrive – should 
result in larger pots for members of defined contribution schemes.  But this does not necessarily 
mean that the level of benefits will be adequate.  The cost of defined benefit pension provision is a 
sensible benchmark against which defined contribution schemes can be measured.  One comparison 
is of the contributions actually paid.  the Office for National Statistics (2016) estimates that in 2015, 
members of open defined benefit schemes contributed 5% of salaries, with employers contributing 
                                                             
2 The number of defined contribution members does not appear to have been added to through personal 
pension membership: according to HMRC (2015), the number of employees contributing to personal pension 
schemes – or having contributions made on their behalf – has stayed constant at 6.0 million. 




16.2% of salaries.  However, these contribution rates reflect not just the cost of ongoing benefits, 
but also the deficit reduction contributions paid in respect of previously accrued benefits.  Instead, it 
makes sense to calculate the cost of future benefits for a defined benefit pension scheme explicitly, 
as I do in this paper, and to compare it to the levels of contributions being made to defined 
contribution schemes. 
2. Organisation of this paper 
First, I outline way in which I calculate the cost of pension accrual, in Section 3.  In this section, I 
describe both the methodology I use, and the assumptions that I make.  In Section 4, I calculate the 
change in earnings, and the appropriate allowance for NICs and for income tax.  In section5 I present 
my results.  First, I give the total cost of accrual, before analysing the factors driving the year-to-year 
changes.  I then look at the impact of defined benefit pension accrual on the cost of employment for 
a company, and then on the value of earnings to an employee. 
3. Calculating the cost of pension accrual 
3.1. Overview 
The cost pension accrual is calculated as a proportion of salary.  It is assumed that the benefit 
accrued is one-sixtieth of earnings, with a retirement age of 65.  It is also assumed that the nature of 
the benefit is career average revalued earnings (CARE): in other words, the pension accrued in any 
year is revalued to retirement in line with price inflation, subject to a maximum of 5% per annum 
over the period.  The pension is then paid for the lifetime of the individual, with increases being paid 
in line with statutory minima.  For simplicity, it is assumed that the individual accruing benefits is a 
man, that no spouse benefits are accrued, and that there is no guarantee period.  The analysis is 
carried out on an annual basis, and the period covered in the main analysis is the 12-month period 
starting 31 March 1995 to the twelve-month period starting 31 March 2015.  These dates are chosen 
to coincide with the changes in tax years that start a few days later on 6 April and, thus, tax rates 
and bands.  The discount and inflation rates as at the previous month end are used. 
The cost of accrual as at 31 March 2015 can be used to calculate the impact of pensions for the 
twelve-month period to 31 March 2016.  However, it is interesting to consider the impact of interest 
rate changes in the light of the Brexit referendum, and also the potential move from statutory to 
conditional increases to pensions in payment. 
On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union.  In order to offset the 
impact of this decision on the UK economy, the Bank of England cut base rates to 0.25% and 
embarked on a policy of Quantitative Easing (QE).  Research on the last program of QE that ran from 
2009 to 2012 indicates that long-term bond yields has been lowered by anything from 30 to 125 
basis points (Meier, 2009; Joyce et al., 2011; Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012; Breedon et al., 2012; 
Bridges and Thomas, 2012; and Kapetanios et al., 2012).  More specific research on the term 
structure of changes, as well as the impact on real interest rates, shows that pension scheme 
liabilities had been significantly inflated by the Bank of England’s purchases (Sweeting et al., 2013).  
Given that long-term interest rates as at 30 September 2016 were significantly lower than they were 
as at 31 March 2016, it seems that the round of quantitative easing (Bank of England, 2016) is having 
a similar impact.  As such, I also look at the cost of accrual calculated on the 31 March 2015 basis, 
but using bond yields and expected inflation as at 31 March 2016 and 30 September 2016. 
In a more recent development, it has been suggested that the guaranteed pensions in payment, 
whether at 5% LPI or 2.5% LPI, could be replaced with conditional indexation (Cumbo, 2016).  This is 
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a mechanism by which increases to pensions are paid only if there are sufficient funds; otherwise, 
pensions remain flat.  It is straightforward to evaluate the impact of such a change on the cost of 
future accrual, so I look at how this would affect the estimated cost of accrual at 30 September 
2016. 
The cost of pension benefits is calculated by projecting into the future the payments arising from the 
year of pension accrual, and then discounting these payments back to give a present value.  More 
precisely, the value at time 0 of a payment made at time 𝑡 (where 𝑡 = 1,2,3 … and is measured in 























where 𝑙𝑥,𝑡 is the projected population for age 𝑥 and time 𝑡; 𝑖𝑡 is the price index at time 𝑡 used to 
revalue benefits before retirement; 𝑖𝑡
𝑐  is the capped price index used to increase benefits after 
retirement at time 𝑡 – that is, the rate of change in the index is limited to some capped amount; and 
𝑑𝑡 is the spot discount rate for a term of 𝑡.  The various price indices used are discussed in section 
3.3.  The discount rate is discussed in section 4.  The total cost of accrual for age 𝑥, per £1 of gross 
earnings, 𝐶𝑥 is therefore obtained by summing the values of these individual cash flows: 





The upper limit in this summation reflects the assumption that no individuals will live beyond 120.  
This is built into the longevity model used, which I describe in section 3.2.  I further define the cost of 
accrual for an individual aged 𝑥 evaluated at time 𝑡 as 𝐶𝑥,𝑡.  This can be used to derive the change in 






A similar formula can be used to calculate the impact on the cost of accrual of longevity, benefit 
changes and interest rates.  Let 𝐶𝑥,𝑡
𝑙  be the cost of accrual for an individual aged 𝑥 evaluated at time 
𝑡, but using the longevity data from 𝑡 − 1.  The element of the change relating to longevity, Δ𝐶𝑥,𝑡









Equivalent expressions can be derived for the impact of benefit changes and interest rates. 
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3.2. The longevity model 
Improving life expectancy clearly has an impact on the cost of future pension accrual.  There are two 
components of longevity that are of interest here.  The first is the expected change in longevity.  
When moving from time 𝑡 to time 𝑡 + 1, one would expect the cost of accrual to increase because of 
anticipated improvements in life expectancy.  However, if the change in longevity is different from 
than anticipated, then this will clearly have an additional impact on the cost of pension accrual. 
In modelling life expectancy, I assume that at any time 𝑡, information on mortality rates will be 
available only up to time 𝑡 − 2.  The mortality data used is central rate of mortality for England and 
Wales males aged 20 to 100, from the Human Mortality Database (2016).  The natural logarithm of 
mortality rates is extrapolated linearly from age 101 to 120, based on data from ages 81 to 100.  I 
then take data from 𝑡 − 21 to 𝑡 − 2 and ages 20 to 120, and apply singular value decomposition to 
the data, as described by Lee and Carter (1992).  I then fit a linear function to the time component, 
and project this forward.  Applying this to the age components gives projected central mortality 
rates for times 𝑡 − 1 onward.  Each central mortality rate 𝑚𝑥,𝑡 is converted to an initial mortality 
rate, 𝑞𝑥,𝑡.  For age 20, the following formula is used: 
𝑞20,𝑡 = 𝑚20,𝑡 [
1 + (1 2⁄ )𝑚21,𝑡
1 + (1 12⁄ )(7𝑚20,𝑡 + 5𝑚21,𝑡) + (1 3⁄ )𝑚20,𝑡𝑚21,𝑡
] 
(5) 
for ages 21 to 100, the following approximation is used: 
𝑞𝑥,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑥,𝑡 [
1 + (1 2⁄ )𝑚𝑥−1,𝑡
1 + (5 12⁄ )(𝑚𝑥,𝑡 − 𝑚𝑥−1,𝑡) − (1 6⁄ )𝑚𝑥,𝑡𝑚𝑥−1,𝑡
] 
(6) 






Each year, a new year of mortality information is assumed to become available, so the projected 
mortality is recalculated. 
As well as allowing the cost of the defined benefit accrual to be calculated, I am also able to isolate 
the impact on the cost of changes in longevity. 
3.3. Benefit changes 
A key part of the analysis is the impact on the cost of pension accrual of the benefit changes that 
have occurred due to legislation.  The first of these was the requirement to provide increases to 
pensions in payment in line with the Retail Prices Index (RPI), subject to a maximum of 5% per 
annum, from 5 April 1997.  This is known as 5% Limited Price Indexation, or 5% LPI.  Prior to 5 April 
1997, no increases to pensions in payment were required unless a scheme was contracted out from 
the State Earnings-Related Pension Scheme.  From April 2005, this minimum requirement was 
reduced, with the cap being cut to 2.5% per annum, giving 2.5% LPI.  In terms of 𝑖𝑡
𝑐, this means that 
if, for example, the index is being considered at a time when 2.5% LPI is in force, the annual change 
in 𝑖𝑡
𝑐  cannot exceed 2.5% even if the change in RPI is greater than 2.5%. 
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From 5 April 2011 the rate of inflation used in the calculation of benefits was changed from the 
Retail Prices Index to the Consumer Prices Index (CPI).  This applies to both the rate underlying the 
5% LPI increases to pensions in payment, and also to the increases to pensions in the period before 
retirement.  As stated in the section 3.1, the pension accrued in any year is revalued to retirement in 
line with price inflation, subject to a maximum of 5% per annum over the period.  Before 5 April 
2011, this measure of inflation was RPI; after this date it was CPI. 
As with the longevity cost, the change in the minimum benefits allows me not only to calculate the 
change in the cost of benefit accrual, but also to isolate the impact on benefit accrual of the change 
in the minimum benefits payable. 
In practice, an individual may have experienced benefit changes over the last two decades other 
than those dictated by legislation.  Key amongst these is the change to a CARE basis from a final 
salary arrangement.  Whilst the former allows for pensions to increase up to retirement in line with 
prices, the latter allows for an increase in line with salaries.  The impact of this change depends on 
the difference between future salary and price inflation, and the age at which any change occurs.  
Another potential change is a change to the retirement age, which again could take many forms.  As 
such, I look at the order of magnitude that such changes might bring but they do not form part of 
the central analysis. 
3.4. Interest rate changes 
Cribb and Emmerson (2016) make a key simplification in their model of pension costs, in that they 
assume a real discount rate of 3% per annum.  This simplification is appropriate for single-period 
cross-sectional analysis.  However, as I show in this paper, the change in discount rate has been an 
important factor in the changing value of defined benefit pensions. 
The discount rate has more than one component.  First, there are the inflation rates used to project 
benefits.  Even if the benefit structure is not changing, the assumed rate of inflation by whatever 
measure is appropriate will develop over time.  For RPI, the assumed rate of inflation is taken from 
the Bank of England’s implied inflation spot curve.  This is calculated from the Bank of England’s 
nominal and real government bond spot curves. 
All index-linked UK government bonds pay coupons based on RPI.  As such, information on the CPI 
spot curve is harder to find.  I therefore approximate it by deducting the average difference between 
historical RPI and CPI for the ten years before the calculation date from the implied inflation spot 
curve. 
The projected cash flows are discounted using the spot rate on the UK nominal government bond 
yield curve at the appropriate term, as calculated by the Bank of England, plus a risk premium.  The 
risk premium is 1% per annum, which is consistent with the difference between the median single 
effective discount rate (SEDR) and the Bank of England 20-year nominal spot rate observed by the 
Pensions Regulator (2016) from 2005 to 2014. 
4. Calculating the change in earnings 
It is interesting to look at how the cost of defined benefit pensions has changed as a proportion of an 
individual’s earnings.  However, it is also instructive to combine this information with the changes in 
earnings themselves – both from the employer’s and the employee’s point of view.  From the 
employer’s point of view, I compare 
 gross earnings excluding pensions; 
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 gross earnings plus employer National Insurance Contributions (NICs); and 
 gross earnings plus employer National Insurance Contributions (NICs) plus defined benefit 
pension accrual. 
From the employee’s point of view, I compare 
 gross earnings excluding pensions; 
 gross earnings less employee National Insurance Contributions (NICs) and income tax; and 
 gross earnings less employee National Insurance Contributions (NICs) and income tax plus 
defined benefit pension accrual. 
Initially, I define gross earnings as UK Private Sector Average Weekly Earnings from January 2000, 
and the UK Private Sector Average Earnings Index before this, both on a seasonally adjusted basis 
and including bonuses.  As these series overlap, I am able to construct a continuous series of annual 
earnings for the full period of analysis.  Annual figures for each twelve-month period running from 
April to the following March are calculated by converting the weekly earnings figure for each month 
to a monthly figure, and then aggregating over the twelve months.  The gross earnings series for the 






To determine the change in the total cost to the employer before pensions, which I denote Δ𝑁𝑡
𝑒𝑟, 
employer national insurance contributions, 𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑡
𝑒𝑟  , must be added to the numerator and 






𝑒𝑟 − 1 
(9) 
The change in net earnings including the cost of pension accrual from the employer’s point of view 
for an individual aged 𝑥 for the year to time 𝑡 is Δ𝑇𝑥,𝑡




𝑒𝑟 + (𝐺𝑡 × 𝐶𝑥,𝑡)
𝐺𝑡−1 + 𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑡−1
𝑒𝑟 + (𝐺𝑡−1 × 𝐶𝑥,𝑡−1)
− 1 
(10) 
where 𝐶𝑥,𝑡 is the cost of accruing an extra year’s pension per £1 of gross earnings for in individual 
aged 𝑥 at time 𝑡.  Note that this is the only earnings measure where age is relevant – in other words, 
I do not allow for any change in gross earnings by age. 
From an employee’s point of view, the calculation is similar, except that NICs are a deduction rather 
than an addition, and that they are deducted along with income tax.  Here, the change in net 
earnings excluding pension accrual is Δ𝑁𝑡













𝑒𝑒represents employee NICs, and 𝐼𝑇𝑡
𝑒𝑒the income tax payable in year 𝑡.  The change in 
net earnings including the cost of pension accrual from the employee’s point of view is Δ𝑇𝑥,𝑡
𝑒𝑒, 





𝑒𝑒 + (𝐺𝑡 × 𝐶𝑥,𝑡)
𝐺𝑡−1 − 𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑡−1
𝑒𝑒 − 𝐼𝑇𝑡−1




5.1. Total cost of accrual 
First, I look at the change in the cost of pension accrual.  As discussed in section 3.1, I consider the 
12-month period starting 31 March 1995 to the twelve-month period starting 31 March 2015, but 
also look at the cost of accrual calculated on the 31 March 2015 basis, using bond yields and 
expected inflation as at 31 March 2016 and 30 September 2016.  These results are given in Figure 5.1 
for a 40 year-old male with a retirement age of 65, assuming a discount rate of UK government 
bonds plus 1% per annum. 
Figure 1 – Accrual rate for a 40 year-old male pension scheme member 
 
Source: Bank of England, Office for National Statistics, author’s calculations 
This shows that in March 1995, the cost of accrual was only 4.2% of earnings, dropping slightly the 
following year to 4.0% of earnings.  The cost of accrual then grew steadily to the period commencing 
31 March 2000, peaking at 12.4%.  It then fell back slightly, before rising steadily up until 16.6% for 
the period commencing 31 March 2008.  March 2009 saw a sharp drop back to 10.7%.  The cost of 
accrual then rose gradually until March 2014, reaching 18.4%.  However, it then rose significantly in 
































































































































































































Cost of Accrual Impact of Conditional Indexation
*Calculated using March 2015 longevity data, but 
interest rate and expected inflation data as at given date
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whilst conditional indexation would cut the cost of accrual significantly, it would still leave it at its 
highest ever level – 27.0% of earnings for the period commencing 30 September 2016. 
5.2. Components of accrual cost 
The three components of the change in the cost of accrual – benefits, longevity and interest rates – 
are described above, as is their calculation.  Because the sum of each of the three components 
leaves a rounding error, I allocate the error to each of the three components in proportion to the 
size of each component.  The results are shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2 – Components of the change in the accrual rate for a 40 year-old male pension scheme member 
 
Source: Bank of England, Office for National Statistics, author’s calculations 
Longevity increases have been a reasonably constant source of increasing pension costs.  Some years 
have been worse than others: 2006 and 2013 both saw longevity contributing to more than a 0.3% 
of earnings increase in the cost of accrual, whilst the average was only 0.2% per annum.  This 
variation largely reflects unexpected increases, rather than the variation arising from a population 
whose longevity is expected to improve.  Overall, though, this 0.2% increase is small compared to 
the 0.9% increase arising from interest rates, which I discuss later. 
The impact of the change in benefits has been, on average, small: it accounts for an increase in the 
cost of accrual of 1.5% of earnings from 1996 to 1997, when 5% LPI was introduced, and then a drop 
of 0.3% of earnings when 5% LPI was replaced by 2.5% LPI in 2005.  The drop here was small because 
expected RPI inflation was not significantly higher than 2.5%.  A larger fall occurs in 2011 when RPI is 
replaced with CPI.  This is partly because increases in both payment and deferment are affected. 
However, the suggested move to conditional indexation for pensions in payment would cause a 
much bigger drop in the cost of accrual: 9.6% of earnings.  This assumes that conditional indexation 





























































































































































































































































































































































Impact of benefits Impact of longevity
Impact of rates Change in cost of accrual
*Changes in interest rate and expected inflation only
**Changes in interest rate, expected inflation and benefits
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cost is so high compared to the introduction of 5% LPI because long-term interest rates are so low 
now compared with 20 years ago.  Figure 3, which shows the 20-year spot rate for nominal UK 
government bonds and for implied RPI inflation, demonstrates this clearly.  This means that the 
present value of a change in future increases is correspondingly higher. 
Figure 3 – 20-year government bond yield and implied RPI inflation rate 
 
Source: Bank of England 
Figure 3 also helps to explain the change in the cost of accrual due to nominal government bond 
yields and implied inflation, which I refer to together as interest rates.  Both of these fell sharply 
from 1996 to 1999, with nominal rates falling more than implied inflation.  This did lead to some 
noticeable increases in the cost of accrual, contributing to an increase of 2.0% of earnings in 1998 
and 2.9% in 1999. However, because the 20-year bond yield in 1999 was still relatively high – at least 
when compared with the current yield – the impact was not catastrophic. 
The combination of a rise in bond yields and a fall in implied inflation in 2001 led to a fall in the cost 
of accrual attributable to interest rates of 2.4% of earnings.  Changes were smaller for a few years 
until interest rates contributed to a rise in the cost of accrual of 2.6% of earnings in 2006 – this time, 
a fall in bond yields coincided with a rise in implied inflation.  The next big change was in 2009.  
Although bond yields fell, implied inflation fell further, leading to a fall in the cost of accrual of 6.1% 
of earnings.  A significant part of this fall was reversed the following year, when a bounce in implied 
inflation resulted in the cost of accrual rising by 4.0% of earnings thanks to interest rate changes 
alone.  The next significant change happened in 2015, when falling bond yields added 6.9% of 
earnings to the cost of accrual, but even this was dwarfed by the fall in yields following the Brexit 
referendum: between March and September 2016, the fall in government bond yields added a 
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5.3. The cost of defined benefit pensions to employers 
Having analysed not only the changes in the cost of accrual but also the drivers of these changes, I 
can now consider the impact of this cost on remuneration.  First, however, it is worth looking at how 
remuneration has changed before allowing for pensions.  If we concentrate on private sector 
earnings, we can easily see the impact of adding National Insurance contributions to employer costs, 
as indicated in Figure 4.  This shows the growth in earnings cost for individual earning 1, 2, 4 and 8 
times average earnings.  The differences arise because of the differences in NIC rates and bands.  It is 
clear here that after 1999, the cost of employing people of all earnings levels increased as a 
proportion of gross earnings. 
Figure 4 – Annualised net and gross cost of earnings, private sector including bonuses, seasonally adjusted, rebased to 100 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics (Average Weekly Earnings from January 2000; constructed series using the Average 
Earnings Index before this), HMRC, author’s calculations 
Focussing on the net earnings at the average level, I then consider the difference between the cost 
of employing an individual in a defined contribution scheme and a defined benefit scheme.  
According to the Office for National Statistics (2015), members contribute on average 5% of earnings 
to private sector defined benefit pension schemes.  The Office for National Statistics (2003) also 
indicate that employee contributions to contributory defined benefit schemes have been at or 
around this level since at least 2000.  This amount must therefore be deducted from the cost of 
accrual, as it is a cost borne by the employee rather than the employer. 
Until 2014, employer contributions to defined contribution schemes had also remained relatively 
stable, at around 6% of earnings.  As outlined in section 1.3, employer contribution rates dropped 
considerably at this point, following the introduction of auto-enrolment.  Since this drop in the 
average contribution rate is due to the addition of a heterogeneous population, and because the 
analysis is intended to be about the cost of defined benefit accrual rather than defined contribution 






























































































































































































































































contribution schemes.  In Figure 5, I therefore show three series for a 40 year-old individual on 
average earnings: the total cost of employment excluding pensions; the total cost of employment 
including a 6% contribution to a defined contribution scheme; and the total cost of employment 
including the cost of accrual for a defined benefit scheme, net of a 5% employee contribution. 
Figure 5 – Annualised cost of average earnings, private sector including bonuses, seasonally adjusted, allowing for pensions 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics (Average Weekly Earnings from January 2000; constructed series using the Average 
Earnings Index before this), HMRC, author’s calculations 
There are two key features in Figure 5.  First, the cost of employing a worker and providing a defined 
benefit pension has grown consistently more quickly than the cost of employing someone in a 
defined contribution scheme.  To be precise, the average increase for a defined benefit employee 
was 4.8% per annum over the last twenty years, compared with 3.7% per annum for a defined 
contribution employee – a difference of 1.1% per annum.  However, it is also interesting to note that 
until 1999-2000, it was actually more expensive to have an employee in a defined contribution 
scheme than to provide membership of a defined benefit scheme. 
The key reason for this is that the analysis here is of a CARE scheme.  Whilst these are increasingly 
popular in the private sector (Vaughan, 2016), and near ubiquitous in the public sector (Cribb and 
Emmerson, 2015), this was not the case 20 years ago.  The change in the value of pension accrual 
moving from final salary to CARE is equivalent to the projected difference between salary inflation 
and price inflation.  However, the cost of such a change depends on when the cost is evaluated.  For 
example, if I use the difference between CPI inflation and private sector earnings inflation from April 
1995 to April 2015 to derive an assumption for the forward-looking difference, I arrive at a figure for 
real earnings of 1.4% per annum.  On this basis, a move from a final salary scheme to a CARE 
arrangement as at March 2016 would be equivalent to a drop in the value of benefits of 42.9% for a 
40 year-old with a retirement age of 65.  This would mean that the cost of employment for a 







































































































































































































































Gross earnings plus employer NICs
Gross earnings plus employer NICs and DC pension cost
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defined contribution scheme member rather than 13.5% higher – in other words, moving from final 
salary to CARE would cut the cost of earnings by some 10% for a working population of 40 year-olds 
if no other changes were made. 
However, using more real earnings data gives a different answer.  If instead I use the difference 
between CPI inflation and private sector earnings inflation from April 2005 to April 2015 to derive an 
assumption for the forward-looking difference, then real earnings appear to have fallen by 0.2% per 
annum.  On this basis, CARE actually appears more valuable than a final salary scheme by some 4% 
for the individual described above. 
5.4. The value of defined benefit pensions to employees 
Moving onto the value of defined benefit pensions for employees, I first look at earnings net of 
employee NICs and income tax.  It is clear from Figure 6 that after 2010, there was a significant move 
to increase redistribution, with net pay for the least well paid increasing relative to gross earnings, 
and the opposite happening for the most well-off.  Clearly, there is no guarantee that the net income 
for an individual would have increased by more or less than the average, but this does at least 
indicate an increasingly redistributive policy. 
Figure 6 – Annualised net and gross value of private sector earnings, including bonuses, seasonally adjusted, rebased to 100 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics (Average Weekly Earnings from January 2000; constructed series using the Average 
Earnings Index before this), HMRC, author’s calculations 
When looking at the value of accrual in Figure 7, I again concentrate on a 40 year-old individual on 
average earnings with a retirement age of 65.  The result, unsurprisingly, has a similar profile to 
employer costs.  The results are similar numerically as well – the average increase in earnings for a 
defined benefit employee was 4.8% per annum over the last twenty years, compared with 3.8% per 






























































































































































































































































Figure 7 – Annualised value of average private sector earnings, including bonuses, seasonally adjusted, allowing for 
pensions 
 
Source: Office for National Statistics (Average Weekly Earnings from January 2000; constructed series using the Average 
Earnings Index before this), HMRC, author’s calculations 
6. Conclusion 
The cost of employing a member of defined benefit pension scheme has outpaced the cost of 
employing someone in a defined contribution arrangement over the last twenty years.  From 1995 
to 2015, the difference in the total cost has been some 1.1% of earnings per annum.  When looking 
instead from an employee’s point of view, the difference in change in the value of a defined benefit 
scheme relative to a defined contribution arrangement is similar – around 1.0% of earnings per 
annum.  This means that allowing for an employee contribution of 5% of earnings, the cost of accrual 
grew from -0.8% of earnings in March 1995 (when the total cost was only 4.8% of earnings) to 20.4% 
of earnings in March 2015. 
The average impact of interest rate changes on the change in the cost of accrual is 0.9% per annum.  
This is significantly more than the average impact of longevity improvements, which is 0.2% per 
annum.  Both of these have added to the total cost.  However, benefit changes marginally offset 
these increases, by around 0.05% per annum on average. 
Looking only at changes in interest rates, the change in cost from March 2015 to March 2016 was 
small, with the estimated cost of accrual to the employer rising only slightly, to 20.6%.  However, 
following the Brexit vote and the subsequent reintroduction of quantitative easing, the estimated 
cost of accrual has risen to 31.7% as at September 2016. 
If the current 2.5% LPI increases to pensions in payment were removed and replaced with 
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Gross earnings less employee NICs and income tax, plus and DC pension value
Gross earnings less employee NICs and income tax, plus and DB pension value
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The total cost of defined benefit accrual – including employee contributions – is therefore 36.6% of 
earnings as at September 2016, a number that would fall to 27.0% of earnings 2.5% LPI increases 
were removed.  Contrast this with current payments to defined contribution schemes, which in 2015 
stood at 4.0% of earnings, of which employers contributed 2.5%.  It is likely that these figures are 
depressed by the large number of newly-auto-enrolled members.  But even before auto-enrolment, 
the total contribution rate to defined contribution schemes was only 8.5%, with employers paying 
6.0%.  This is marginally above the maximum auto-enrolment level that will be reached in April 2019, 
of 8% of earnings, with employers paying at least 3% – less than a third of the amount needed to 
match even a non-increasing defined benefit pension. 
If we remain in a low growth, low interest rate environment, contributions to defined contribution 
schemes will need to rise sharply.  If they do not, individuals relying on these schemes will reach 
retirement with inadequate assets and very uncertain futures – and the only group able to support 
them will be taxpayers. 
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